TIME: Almanac 1995

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<text id=91TT0723> <title> Apr. 08, 1991: The Third Way </title> <history> TIME--The Weekly Newsmagazine--1991 Apr. 08, 1991 The Simple Life </history> <article> <source>Time Magazine</source> <hdr> WORLD, Page 39 The Third Way </hdr><body> A Soviet strategist argues that while repression is all too possible, it is not inevitable By Igor Malashenko [Igor Malashenko is a senior analyst in the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.] In the aftermath of the referendum on the future of the U.S.S.R., many Soviets and Americans seem to agree that reform is dead, or at least dying. They cite the troubles besetting perestroika, new limits on glasnost, the growing role of the military and the KGB in domestic politics, and an overall shift to the right. Pessimists talk as though there were only two alternatives: the disintegration of the country or the return of totalitarianism. In fact, while each nightmare scenario is plausible, a third, far happier outcome is still possible. Indeed, it could come about as a result of the interaction between the two dangers everyone fears. A civil war, resulting in the breakup of the union, may occur if the central authorities deny the right of national self-determination and thus provoke secessionist explosions across the country. Or Russian nationalists could deliberately stimulate secessionism. But history could help us avert such a disaster. We experienced civil war at the beginning of this century. Perhaps the vividness of that memory will deter us from repeating the same mistake at the end of this century. No one, no matter what his grievances against Moscow, should want to see the violent collapse of the largest country on earth, since it could escalate into World War III. Some secessionists, recalling how Western nations sent troops into Russia in 1918-19, may think the West would do so again. That is foolish. The Soviet Union's enormous stockpile of nuclear weapons alone would prevent outsiders from intervening. As for Stalinism--the other horror from our past--the danger that it might return is real but not unavoidable. Conservatives argue that the rapid decline in the standard of living, the growing crime rate, the spread of ethnic violence and the deterioration of public morale justify Stalinist practices as a means of restoring social stability and maintaining the integrity of the country. But it will be difficult for them to turn back the clock. Too much of their program is too deeply compromised. Soviet society is fed up with ideological junk food. The one-party political system has been shattered. The development of political pluralism has passed the point where it can be reversed. Many talk about the army and the KGB as though they were monolithic. Actually, they are as divided as the rest of society. Because of those divisions, neither the military nor the KGB is a realistic instrument for a would-be dictator to suppress opposition throughout the country. Besides, even if it were possible to reimpose totalitarianism, no one is under any illusion that it would solve the country's economic problems. Quite the contrary, a severe lurch to the right would lead to another cold war in the Soviet Union's relations with the West, and that would mean even less foreign trade and investment. Clearly, the best hope for our country--and the best strategy for its leadership--is to steer a middle course between the extremes. Perhaps not quite so obviously, Mikhail Gorbachev has an opportunity in the wake of the referendum to take advantage of a new phenomenon in our political life: the opposing tendencies now at play tend to balance one another and provide a base for the evolutionary development of democracy. Yes, there is a trend toward consolidation of the central authority, but it is being offset by the growing self-assertiveness of the republics. Yes, there is pressure from the bureaucracy to keep major aspects of the centrally planned economy intact, but there is also a growing demand, from different regions and industries, for economic independence. Yes, some parts of the Soviet media are now almost as conformist as they were in the old days, but plenty of other newspapers and magazines continue to express the most unorthodox views. Yes, there have been attempts to maintain order by repressive means, but the forces of liberalization are recovering from recent defeats and gaining new strength. Our political and ideological crisis has created a vacuum that can best be filled by new ideas and new institutions, not old ones. Therefore the centralized economy may yet move toward a form of "state capitalism," with competition among enterprises that resemble stockholder-owned corporations. Tough, intense bargaining may yet produce different solutions to different republics' needs and demands. The U.S.S.R. may become a new, diverse federation. Some republics will be run from Moscow; others will delegate only foreign and defense policy to the central government; and a few, notably the Baltics, will have "associated status,'' which gives them virtually complete independence. A much more loosely organized but still viable and stable federation--an outcome consistent with the wishes of the people as expressed in the referendum--would be powerful enough to guarantee its own security, but not to be perceived by other nations as a threat. The emergence of what George Kennan foresaw in 1947 as a "mellowed" Soviet Union is not only in the interests of those of us who live there but of the rest of the world as well. </body></article> </text>